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With net °ows of ¯nancial capital into the US running at about 7% of GDP | and
similar °ows out of Germany and Japan | it's increasingly di±cult to think about
the allocation of physical capital without considering its international dimension. We
may not live in a world of frictionless international capital markets, but international
markets nevertheless appear to have a signi¯cant impact on local conditions. Despite
this, there are substantial di®erences in the capital intensities of developed countries.
By our calculations, capital-output ratios in 2004 were about 2.5 in the US, 3.1 in
France, 3.9 in Japan, and 1.8 in Ireland. These di®erences in capital-output ratios
suggest similar di®erences in marginal products. If the US and Japan produced output
with the same Cobb-Douglas production function, with a capital share of one-third,
the implied marginal product of capital would be about 5% higher in the US. The
question is why. While some ask why capital °ows out of Japan and into the US are
so large, we ask why they aren't large enough to eliminate a conjectured 5% rate of
return di®erential.
There are many possible sources of cross-country di®erences in capital-output ra-
tios, but we focus on one: taxes, particularly corporate taxes. Could di®erences in tax
rates account for some of the heterogeneity we see in capital-output ratios? Certainly
corporate tax rates di®er substantially across countries, and these di®erences can, in
principle, generate substantial variation in capital-output ratios. The US, for exam-
ple, now has a relatively high corporate tax rate, which might o®set the advantages
to an investor of its apparent high marginal product of capital.
We examine data on capital and taxes in a panel of OECD countries over the
last 25 years to see whether the two variables are related in a statistical sense. The
answer? It depends how you measure tax rates. For that reason, much of our e®ort
is devoted to measurement issues.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the relation between the capital-
output ratio and the tax rate on capital in a frictionless theoretical example. The
example provides a concrete illustration of how high taxes on capital might be asso-ciated with low capital-output ratios. In Section 3, we look at capital data, summa-
rizing the behavior of capital-output ratios across countries and over time. Although
capital-output ratios have been stable in most countries, the data exhibit substantial
variation both over time and across countries. Measurement issues include investment
price de°ators and depreciation schedules. In Section 4, we look at tax data. We use
two sources: revenue collected by various taxes, including taxes on corporate income,
and e®ective tax rates constructed from features of the tax code. Tax systems are
enormously complex, so each of these approaches raises substantive measurement is-
sues. With e®ective tax rates, we show that there's been a dramatic convergence over
the last decade or so, as well as a decline in average tax rates. Tax revenue, however,
has changed much less as a fraction of GDP. The di®erence between these two mea-
sures is a central issue in interpreting the evidence. Have corporate tax rates become
more similar across countries | or not? In Section 5, we look at the relation between
capital-output ratios and tax rates. For measures of tax rates based on corporate tax
law, the correlation with the capital-output ratio is small or positive. However, for
measures based on tax revenue the correlation is clearly negative, with countries that
collect more tax revenue having, on average, less capital per unit of output. However,
even revenue-based taxes explain only a small fraction of the observed variance in
capital-output ratios. A more formal analysis based on panel regressions leads to
similar conclusions. In the ¯nal two sections, we explore a range of related issues,
including mechanisms that might lead to correlations between capital and taxes for
reasons other than the direct impact of tax rates on investment decisions.
We are left with two outstanding issues: why e®ective and revenue-based tax rates
are so di®erent, and why even revenue-based measures explain such a small fraction
of international di®erences in capital-output ratios.
2 The allocation of capital in theory
An example shows how international capital mobility might interact with taxes in
producing an allocation of capital across countries. The idea is that taxes on capital
2reduce its use, leading countries with high taxes (suitably de¯ned) to use less capital
than those with low taxes. We emphasize taxes levied on businesses for reasons that
should become apparent later on.
Consider a world with one good and many countries across which physical capital
can be shifted costlessly. In each country i, a representative ¯rm produces output yit
at date t using capital kit and labor nit according to the same production function f:
yit = f(kit;zitnit);
where f is homogeneous of degree one and zit is exogenous labor-augmenting produc-
tivity. Firms purchase capital kit in the previous period at price pt¡1, the same across
countries. Capital and labor generate output yit and next-period capital (1 ¡ ±)kit,
where ± is the depreciation rate. This \gross output" has price pt. The price of labor
in country i is ptwit per unit, so that wit is the wage in units of the date-t good. The
interest rate is 1 + rt¡1 = pt¡1=pt.
Without taxes, the pro¯t of a competitive ¯rm in country i is
Pro¯t = pt[f(kit;zitnit) + (1 ¡ ±)kit ¡ witnit] ¡ pt¡1kit:
Its optimal choice of capital follows from the ¯rst-order condition:
1 + rt¡1 = 1 + fk(kit;zitnit) ¡ ±; (1)
where fk(k;zn) = @f(k;zn)=@k is the marginal product of capital gross of deprecia-
tion. Since ¯rms in all countries have the same technologies and face the same interest
rate, they equalize their marginal products of capital. We can be more speci¯c if we
have a CES production function,
f(k;zn) = [!k
º + (1 ¡ !)(zn)
º]
1=º;
with 0 < ! < 1 and º · 1. The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs is




3so that international capital markets equate capital-output ratios.
With taxes, the international allocation of capital depends on tax rates and the
way in which taxes are collected. The most common version is to tax returns to
capital net of depreciation at a constant rate ¿it, so that after-tax pro¯t is
Pro¯t = pt [(1 ¡ ¿it)ff(kit;zitnit) ¡ ±kit ¡ witnitg + kit] ¡ pt¡1kit:
In an international context, the implicit assumption is that capital taxes are source-
based: the tax rate applies to the country in which the capital is used, regardless of
who owns it. The ¯rst-order condition for capital now implies
1 + rt¡1 = 1 + (1 ¡ ¿it)[fk(kit;zitnit) ¡ ±]: (3)
In the CES case, there is an inverse relation across countries between the tax rate
on capital and the capital-output ratio. This relation is predicated on countries
having identical production functions. Di®erences in, say, depreciation rates ± or
share parameters ! also lead to international di®erences in capital-output ratios.
A numerical example gives us a sense of the magnitudes involved. Suppose º =
0 (Cobb-Douglas production function), ! = 1=3 (capital's share), and ± = 0:08
(depreciation rate). Then the marginal product of capital is 13.3% with the US
capital-output ratio of 2.5, 10.8% with France's ratio of 3.1, and 8.5% with Japan's
ratio of 3.9. Now consider the impact of taxes. Suppose the US tax rate is 25%, a
number we use purely for illustration. Then the after-tax (net) return is 4.0%. If the
tax is eliminated, the capital-output ratio that generates the same after-tax return is
2.78, a signi¯cant increase over 2.5. More generally, the magnitude of the impact will
depend on the elasticity of substitution, which is one in this case.
Real-world taxes raise a number of issues that go beyond our example, including
our focus on business taxes. Among them are
² Personal taxation. Most governments tax capital income received by individu-
als, including interest receipts, dividends, rent, and capital gains. Tax-sheltered
pensions and personal saving mitigate the impact of personal taxes on capital
4income in most countries, but the degree of mitigation is an open issue. Owner-
occupied housing goes the other way, with many countries subsidizing it relative
to other housing. In practice, it's di±cult to measure the e®ective personal tax
rate on capital income alone, since personal income tax systems typically lump
capital and labor income together. Moreover, taxation at the personal level is
more likely to be based on the location of the investor (residence-based) than
the investment (source-based).
Personal taxes also raise issues about the integration of personal and business
taxes. In the US, for example, dividends are taxed at both the corporate and
individual levels, while interest payments are not. In contrast, many other
countries credit individuals with any taxes paid by corporations on dividends.
² Heterogeneous treatment of producers. We focus on international di®erences in
tax rates, but there are also important di®erences across producers in the same
country. One such di®erence is legal structure: corporations, privately-held
¯rms, partnerships, and nonpro¯ts are taxed at di®erent rates in many coun-
tries. In the US, the income of traditional \C" corporations is taxed directly,
but the income of \S" corporations (typically smaller ¯rms with fewer share-
holders) is treated as individual income but not taxed at the corporate level.
Some tax rates depend on the industry of the producer. And di®erences in the
technology of production (capital intensity and depreciation, for example) or in
the method of ¯nancing (debt, equity, or retained earnings) can lead to di®erent
e®ective tax rates even when the statutory rates are the same.
² Taxation of multinational corporations. Producers who operate in more than
one country face multiple tax authorities as a result. There are no general
rules about how these tax systems interact; where multinational tax agreements
exist, they often di®er across pairs of countries. In the worst case, the overall
tax rate can be higher than the highest individual rate. But ¯rms typically
have numerous opportunities to shift revenue and expenses across countries:
transfer pricing, issuing debt in high-tax countries, collecting royalties in low-tax
countries, and so on, which can reduce overall e®ective tax rates substantially.
5It's hard to say where this leaves incentives to invest in physical capital.
These issues and more are discussed at length by Auerbach (2006), Congressional Bud-
get O±ce (2005), Devereux (2006), Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm (2002), Jorgenson
(1993), King and Fullerton (1984), McGrattan and Prescott (2005), Mintz (1995),
and Poterba and Summers (1985). Most of these papers include extensive references
to the relevant literature. Our ¯rst-order approximation is Auerbach (1979) and King
(1974): ¯rms ¯nance investment with retained earnings at the margin and corporate
taxation alone a®ects investment decisions.
3 The allocation of capital in practice
After Feldstein and Horioka (1980) wrote their celebrated paper on international
capital mobility, economists realized that net capital °ows had played little role in
the allocation of capital across developed countries in the 1960s. Countries with
high saving rates also had high investment rates. Equally striking but less celebrated
were the large di®erences in those rates: average investment rates ranged from 19%
in the UK and the US to 26% in France and an astounding 37% in Japan. (These
numbers are averages for 1960-74, reported in their Table 1.) Even with di®erences in
output growth rates and the prices and composition of investment goods, this range
of investment rates must surely re°ect substantial di®erences in capital-output ratios.
Since then we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the scale and scope of interna-
tional ¯nancial transactions, and even some weakening of the link between saving and
investment. Has there been a parallel tendency toward convergence of capital-output
ratios across countries? Figure 1 and Table 1 suggest not. It's apparent in both that
capital-output ratios continue to vary across countries, and in some cases across time
as well.
In Figure 1, we describe capital-output ratios for OECD countries for the period
1980 to 2004. The top panel summarizes the cross-country evidence with \spaghetti
plots:" a time series plot of 15 countries over the whole period. The countries (here
6and throughout the paper) are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
Individual countries are not identi¯able in the ¯gure, but the plot gives us a sense of
both dispersion across countries and changes over time. The bottom panel tells the
same story with time series of cross-section means and standard deviations. Over this
period the mean fell and the standard deviation rose, but both changes have been
small. We ¯nd the lack of convergence somewhat surprising, given the globalization
of capital markets over the last 25 years, but it's a robust feature of the data.
We ¯nd the behavior of individual countries equally interesting, if not necessarily
representative. In the US, the capital-output ratio has been between 2.4 and 2.8 since
1970. In France, the capital-output ratio rose from 2.6 to 3.1 during the 1970s, but
has been between 3.0 and 3.2 ever since 1980. In Japan, by contrast, the capital-
output ratio has risen steadily, from 2 in 1970 to 3 in 1980 to almost 4 in 2005[??].
The investment rate fell in the 1990s, but slower growth in output led to further
increase in the ratio of capital to output. In Ireland, the capital-output ratio fell
from 3.0 in 1986 to about 1.8 in 2005, a period of rapid growth and (apparently) low
corporate tax rates. The standard deviations bottom panel of the ¯gure remind us
that increase in dispersion suggested by Ireland and Japan is not representative, but
they are interesting examples in their own right.
In Table 1, we report the same data in di®erent form. There we see, for example,
that the variation in total capital-output ratios in our panel is substantial: the overall
standard deviation is 0.45, about 15% of the mean of 3.1. The standard deviation
between countries (the standard deviation of the country means) is almost as large
(0.41), suggesting that most of the variation in our panel is between countries. The
components of capital are similar: government, housing, and business capital all show
considerable variation, with di®erence between countries accounting for most of it.
The capital stocks on which these tables and ¯gures are based are computed from
real investment series in the OECD's Economic Outlook Database. The database
includes three categories of investment: government, private housing, and other pri-
vate investment (business plant and equipment). We construct stock series for each
7component by the perpetual inventory method using depreciation rates speci¯c to
each category starting with values for 1970 (our starting point) reported by Kamps
(2006). Sources and methods are described further in Appendix A. Extensive exper-
imentation with di®erences in depreciation schedules suggests to us that none of the
speci¯cs matter much as long as countries are treated the same way.
This approach to capital measurement is the industry standard, but there are
nevertheless some issues to consider. One is that the composition of business capital
has changed over time, and may di®er across countries as well. In the US, there's been
a shift in business investment from structures to equipment and software, with the
result that the average depreciation rate has risen. See, for example, the discussion
in Gomme and Rupert (2007). The OECD data do not have enough detail to allow
us to account explicitly for di®erences in composition; we try to account for this
by using depreciation rates for business and government capital that increase over
time. A related issue is that the de¯nition of capital goods di®ers somewhat across
countries, with the US including software and most other countries not. Intangibles,
such as patents, brand equity, and databases, are disregarded uniformly. There is
little we can do about either with existing data. A third issue is that real investment
is based on o±cial price indexes, whose quality varies across countries. In the US,
price indexes incorporate large adjustments for quality improvements, which raises
measures of real investment. Some observers think this is done less successfully in
other countries, so that their real investment series are understated.
All of these issues are worth mentioning, but we nevertheless think there is more
signal than noise in observed capital-output ratios. Countries with high capital-
output ratios are generally those with high investment rates, so it would take an
amazing congruence of measurement errors to eliminate or reverse the ranking of
capital intensities across countries.
84 Taxes in practice
The next step is to examine data on tax rates. Taxes have virtually unlimited poten-
tial for complexity, but our hope is that reasonable summary measures will capture
some of the tax incentives to purchase and use physical capital. We focus on corporate
tax rates for reasons outlined in Section 2.
There are two common approaches to measuring tax rates, on capital and oth-
erwise. One is based on o±cial tax rates, the other on tax revenue. We look at
both. So-called e®ective corporate tax rates are based on o±cial rates. The current
state-of-the-art for corporate taxation starts with King and Fullerton (1984), who
summarized the many features of existing tax systems in a one-dimensional measure.
E®ective tax rates take statutory rates and make adjustments that bring them closer
to the rates relevant for investment decisions. One is accelerated depreciation. Many
countries allow companies to subtract depreciation at a faster rate, which reduces the
tax burden on capital by bringing the depreciation allowance forward in time. Some
countries even allow investments to be \expensed," making depreciation e®ectively
immediate for tax purposes and possibly eliminating the incentive e®ects of the tax
(Abel, 2007). Another adjustment is tax credits: tax reductions or even subsidies
for some kinds of investment. A third is debt. Most countries allow companies to
subtract interest on debt from taxable income, which reduces the e®ective tax rate
on investments ¯nanced by debt. The impact of this change depends on the nominal
interest rate, hence in°ation.
We use Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemmm's (2002) implementation of this method-
ology. We take three of their measures: the statutory corporate tax rate, the marginal
e®ective rate, and the average e®ective rate. All of these tax rates vary, in princi-
ple, across industries and regions within countries, so the reported rates require some
judgement about what a typical company would pay. In Table 1, we see that rates of
all kinds di®er substantially across countries. The statutory corporate tax rate in our
sample has a mean of 38% and a standard deviation of 11%. The standard deviation
of country means is 8%, so about half the total variance is between countries. E®ec-
9tive marginal and average rates are lower, on average, but exhibit similar variation.
Again, much of the variation is between countries, although not to the extent we saw
with capital-output ratios.
Figure 2 shows, however, that there has also been signi¯cant variation over time
in the e®ective marginal tax rate. In the top panel, we see both a decline in the
overall level of tax rates and a decline in dispersion. Both show up in the bottom
panel, where we see that the mean tax rate has fallen from about 30% to below 20%.
The cross-section standard deviation has declined by two-thirds over the same period.
Both of these features are documented by Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemmm (2002).
Statutory and e®ective average tax rates (not shown) have similar properties.
The second approach to measuring tax rates is to base them on tax revenues.
If we have information on tax revenues and the tax base, then we can compute
a tax rate as the ratio. Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) is the template, and
Carey and Rabesona (2002) is a recent extension and re¯nement. In the case of
capital taxation, taxes are paid by individuals through the personal income tax and
businesses through corporate or other business taxes. In some cases, there are direct
levies on capital that should also be included: property taxes, wealth taxes, and
so on. The idea behind this approach is that by looking at taxes paid we get a
realistic picture of the tax burden. There are also some well-known problems. One
is that we have, by construction, a backward measure of the average tax rate, not
the marginal rate applied to current investments. Another is that it's often di±cult
to ¯nd reliable data on the relevant tax base. For example, in the case of personal
taxation of capital income, it's not clear from standard data sources how much of the
revenue from the personal income tax comes from taxes on capital income rather than
labor income. Similarly, for corporate taxes it's di±cult to ¯nd measures of taxable
corporate income that correspond to reported tax revenue. Finally, revenue-based
tax measures typically make no distinction between average and marginal tax rates.
We construct several revenue-based tax measures from data collected by the
OECD and reported in its Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries. Per-
sonal taxes are re°ected in revenue collected from individual income taxes expressed
10as a fraction of GDP. Tax rates are likely higher than this, since the tax base is
smaller than GDP, but it's not clear how to approximate the relevant tax base. Table
1 shows that the average has been 11% with a standard deviation of 3%. Corporate
taxes are re°ected in revenue from corporate income taxes. We express this revenue
as a ratio to GDP and as a ratio to a crude approximation to gross capital income,
which we describe next.
We approximate gross capital income, capital's share of GDP, and the average
product of capital with income data from the OECD's Annual National Accounts.
The central di±culty is that these accounts do not contain detailed breakdowns of
gross domestic income that translate directly into labor and capital income. The
category \gross operating surplus and mixed income" includes, among other things,
corporate income (presumably capital) and mixed income (what US accounts refer to
as \proprietors' income," a combination of labor and capital income). We divide this
into its components | operating surplus and mixed income { using average shares
in the US: 35% operating surplus and 65% mixed income. Next we divide mixed
income between labor and capital using the same shares as other income. Finally,
we disregard taxes and subsidies in both factor income and total income, computing
factor shares from what's left. The factor shares are then applied to gross domestic
income to produce factor incomes. This calculation leads to the measures summarized
in Table 1. Capital's share is 34%, on average, with standard deviations of 4% overall
and 3% between countries. The average product of capital, measured as a ratio of
capital's share to the capital-output ratio, is 11%, with a standard deviation of 2%
both overall and across countries.
The striking feature of our two revenue-based tax measures | ratios of corporate
tax revenue to GDP and gross capital income | is how di®erent they are from
the e®ective rates. The revenue-based tax rate (the ratio of corporate tax revenue to
capital income) is much smaller, perhaps because the tax base is too large: it includes
depreciation and the income of noncorporate business, neither of which is part of the
corporate tax base. This level e®ect does not explain, however, the large di®erence in
time series behavior. While the e®ective rates have fallen and converged over the last
25 years, Figure 3 shows that the revenue-based tax rate has increased, on average,
11with little change in the dispersion across countries. Devereux (2006) documents a
similar discrepancy between e®ective tax rates and corporate tax revenue expressed
as a fraction of GDP.
In short, tax rates based on the tax code and tax revenues give much di®erent
pictures of recent history.
5 Capital and taxes in practice
We've now seen international evidence on capital, in the form of capital-output ratios,
and taxes, in the form of e®ective tax rates on corporate income and revenue-based
measures of personal and corporate income taxes. Both exhibit substantial variation
across countries. We can now address our question: are cross-country di®erences in
capital intensity related to di®erences in tax rates? Certainly theory suggests that
an increase in tax rates will reduce the amount of capital used in production. Is that
what we see in the data? We look at the data in two ways: with bivariate correlations
and panel regressions.
Correlations
In Table 2, we report correlations between pairs of the same variables we described in
Table 1: capital-output ratios, tax measures, and some other variables. The essence
of our ¯ndings is apparent in the correlations between capital-out ratios and taxes.
For e®ective tax rates, the correlations are consistently positive: countries with
high tax rates also have high capital-output ratios on average. For example, the cor-
relation of the e®ective marginal corporate tax rate with the total capital-output ratio
is 0.41. If high tax rates discourage capital formation, there is little evidence of it in
this data. The positive correlation between tax rates and capital intensity is puzzling,
especially given the amount of variation in each. One possibility is that our de¯nition
of the capital stock (total capital) is too broad: certainly government capital, and
perhaps housing, are not subject to the same tax incentives facing business capital.
12Yet when we look at business capital alone, the result is the same: capital and tax
rates are positively correlated.
The positive correlation between capital and taxes re°ects both time series and
cross section dimensions of the data, but we'll see shortly that the cross section is
central. France, for example, has a high capital-output ratio, but also a high tax rate.
Even in the time series, there is little evidence of a negative relationship. We've seen
that corporate tax rates have declined, on average. We might therefore expect to see
an increase in capital-output ratios. We don't. Average capital-output ratios have
been °at. Ireland, for example, has the lowest tax rates in our sample, but in recent
times has also had a low capital-output ratio. Ireland also experienced a sharp drop
in corporate tax rates, yet its capital-output ratio has fallen. Moreover, a substantial
drop in France's corporate tax rate has been associated with virtually no change in its
capital-output ratio. This pattern holds whether we look at statutory corporate tax
rates or any of the e®ective tax rates computed by Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm
(2002). It seems that the state-of-the-art in modern public ¯nance is of little help in
explaining di®erences in the global allocation of capital.
In contrast, revenue-based tax rates are negatively correlated with capital inten-
sity. For example, the correlation of corporate tax revenue, expressed as a ratio
to capital income, with the total capital-output ratio is {0.37. Note, too, that the
revenue-based tax rate is negatively correlated with the e®ective tax rate.
Evidently it makes a big di®erence which tax measure we use, but many of the
details matter less. Note, ¯rst, that the three \o±cial" corporate tax rate series are
highly correlated: the statutory tax rate, the e®ective marginal tax rate, and the
e®ective average tax rate. The three are based on similar inputs, and lead to similar
measures of tax rates as a result. Second, the correlations of these tax rates with
revenue-based measures are small or even negative. For example, the correlation be-
tween the e®ective marginal tax rate and the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP
is 0.16. The two measures are clearly picking up di®erent things. Third, the capital
series are highly correlated, especially total capital and business capital. For this
reason, it makes little di®erence whether we look at total capital, business capital, or
13private capital (business plus housing). Finally, capital-output ratios are positively
correlated with our three measures of corporate tax rates, but negatively with corpo-
rate tax revenue. This last ¯nding is directly related to the role of taxes in the global
allocation of capital, and therefore worth a closer look.
Regressions
The correlations between capital and tax measures are suggestive, but panel data
regressions shed additional light on both the source of the correlation (time series or
cross section?) and its magnitude (are the numbers reasonable given our theory?).
Put more concretely: These regressions allow us to vary the source of information by
using time and country ¯xed e®ects. They also allow us to interpret the coe±cients as
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, allowing us to judge whether
the magnitude is reasonable.
We estimate a relation between capital-output ratios and tax rates that follows
from our theoretical example. If we allow countries to have di®erent production
functions, then equations (2) and (3) imply
(1 ¡ ¿it)[!i (kit=yit)
º¡1 ¡ ±] = (1 ¡ ¿jt)[!j (kjt=yjt)
º¡1 ¡ ±] = rt¡1;
where !i is a country-speci¯c capital share. We refer to (1 ¡ ¿) as the \tax wedge."
If ± (¿jt ¡ ¿it) is small, then
¢log(kit=yit) ¼ ¾ ¢log(1 ¡ ¿it) + ¾ ¢log!i; (4)
where the notation ¢xj refers to the di®erence in variable x for country j relative to
the US (so that ¢xj ´ xj ¡xUS). This di®erencing is equivalent to using ¯xed e®ects
for time, eliminating (in our example) the impact of variation in the world interest
rate. As before, ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ º) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor. Country-speci¯c share parameters !i lead to country ¯xed e®ects.
One implication of equation (4) is that the variation in tax rates is too small to
account for the variation we see in capital-output ratios. Suppose, for example, that
14¾ = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case) and all countries have the same capital share !. Then
the log-di®erence in capital-output ratios must equal the log-di®erence in tax wedges.
The variances are related in general by
Var [¢log(kj=yj)] = ¾
2Var [¢log(1 ¡ ¿j)]:
In our data, the cross-country variance of the left-hand side 0.03. The cross-country
variance of the right-hand side is about 0.01 for e®ective tax rates, and much less
for revenue-based tax rates. With a plausible elasticity of substitution, it's clear that
these tax rates do not vary enough across countries to account for a large share of
the variance of capital-output ratios in our data.
We report estimates of equation (4) with a variety of tax measures in Table 3.
The dependent variable in each case is the log-di®erence in (total) capital-output
ratios. The message is similar to what we found with correlations. With e®ective tax
rates, the impact of taxes on the capital-output ratio depends on whether we include
country e®ects. Without them [regression (B)], the coe±cient estimate is {0.34. With
them [regression (C)], the estimate is 0.14. It appears, then, that it's the cross-section
information that drives the estimate to be negative: when we introduce country ¯xed
e®ects, the sign changes. Even in this case the magnitude is small, particularly if
we interpret it as an elasticity of substitution. With our revenue-based tax rate, the
coe±cient estimate is positive both with and without country e®ects [regressions (H)
and (I), respectively]. Moreover, the magnitudes (1.38 and 1.04) are consistent with
something like a Cobb-Douglas production function.
The broad features of this evidence survive when we confront them with a battery
of sensitivity tests (not reported). They include:
² Private capital. Our theory has implications for private capital decisions, yet
we reported regressions using total capital. If we use the ratio of business cap-
ital to GDP, or of private capital (business plus housing) to GDP, very little
changes. We might also use the ratio of business private capital to the compa-
rable measure of output, but that poses a challenge of measurement challenge:
we do not have direct measurements of private GDP. We therefore approximate
15it by subtracting government purchases. With this approximate measure, the
estimated coe±cients are often larger, but the stark di®erence between e®ective
and revenue-based tax rates remains.
² Stability over time. Some have argued that capital mobility, which underlies our
theory, is a better approximation in the second half of our sample than the ¯rst.
If we split the sample in two | 1980-1992 and 1993-2005 | the coe±cients are
more precisely estimated in the second half of the sample. If we include country
¯xed e®ects, the coe±cient of the e®ective marginal tax rate in the second half
of the sample remains small and the coe±cient of the revenue-based tax rate
rises. The changes are small in both cases, but the latter might suggest that
there has been an increase in the degree of capital mobility over our sample
period.
² Business cycles. Another modi¯cation is to eliminate the high-frequency or
business cycle variation in the data, possibly because we think taxes operate
over longer periods of time. If we use ¯ve-year averages of the variables in our
regressions, the changes in coe±cient estimates are modest but the standard
errors increase substantially.
No doubt others will think of more ways to interpret the data, but it seems to us that
the features we've described are reasonably robust to a broad range of variation in
statistical methodology.
The bottom line? Both correlations and regressions show signi¯cant relations
between capital-output ratios and corporate tax rates. The di±culty is that the sign
of the relation depends on how we measure tax rates. With e®ective tax rates, then
higher taxes are associated with higher capital-output ratios. But with revenue-based
tax rates, higher taxes are associated with lower capital-output ratios. The latter are
easier to rationalize, but both are resilient features of our data.
166 Discussion
The data give us two di®erent messages: e®ective tax rates are positively correlated
with capital-output ratios, while revenue-based tax rates are negatively correlated. A
reasonable person could emphasize either one, or perhaps neither. We lean toward
the evidence from revenue-based taxes (high tax rates discourage capital formation),
but it's worth further discussion.
Measurement error. None of our data are measured without error: capital-output
ratios, tax rates, and so on. Could measurement error account for some or all of
what we've found? Classical measurement error of capital would tend to reduce its
correlation with all variables, which hardly explains why our two tax measures have
correlations of opposite sign. However, we can imagine more complicated arguments
in which the same measurement error has the opposite e®ect on capital and tax
rates. One such example is measurement error in income/output, which might (so the
story goes) increase income tax revenues and decrease capital-output ratios, thereby
generating a negative correlation between the two. There is, in fact, a tendency for
tax revenues to rise in booms, perhaps through a distribution e®ect on ¯rms: the
percentage of loss-making ¯rms falls, raising measured average tax rates. It's not
clear whether this e®ect is large enough to generate the correlation we see in the
data, but it's a possibility.
Reverse causality. Another possibility is that the correlations we've documented
are right, but are delivered by a di®erent mechanism. Here's one such story. Suppose
capital owners lobby to in°uence the taxes they pay. Then they would likely lobby
more when the capital-output ratio is high, possibly generating lower taxes in such
cases. This produces the negative correlation between capital and tax rates we de-
scribed earlier, but the causality works the other way: high capital intensity leads to
lower tax rates. Alternatively, we might imagine that the political process balances
the adverse incentive e®ects of capital taxation against their ability to raise revenue.
The latter is likely to be more important when capital intensity is high, which could
generate a positive association between capital tax rates and capital-output ratios.
17Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004) provide an illustration of this mech-
anism. Both show that the relation between capital and taxes can be more complex
than the example we described in Section 2.
Micro and macro evidence. In the investment literature, studies generally ¯nd
little impact of taxes with aggregate data, but substantial impact when they use ¯rm
or industry data. See, for example, Hassett and Hubbard's (2002) survey. Gordon
and Hines (2002) and and Hines (1999) describe a similar di®erence between macro
and micro evidence in the international tax literature. From this perspective, our
suggestion of a signi¯cant impact of taxes in aggregate data is unusual. Whether it
represents an improvement in measurement or something entirely di®erent remains
to be seen.
7 Final thoughts
We've examined the role of taxes, particularly corporate taxes, on the global allocation
of physical capital in a sample of OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. The results
are mixed. If we take the state-of-the-art in public ¯nance | various measures of
e®ective corporate tax rates | there's little relation between capital and taxes. If
we take corporate tax revenue as an indicator of tax rates, the results are stronger:
countries that collect a lot of tax revenue also have less capital, on average. Even
these results raise some questions. One question is why di®erences across countries
are so large. Even the most optimistic interpretation of the evidence leaves a large
fraction of the variation in capital-output ratios unexplained. Another is why the two
measures of tax variables are so di®erent.
In some ways, our di±culty in disentangling the impact of taxes from other factors
re°ects a similar di±culty that public ¯nance economists have had with ¯rm-level
data. Despite overwhelming anecdotal evidence that taxes a®ect ¯rm decisions, it's
taken both e®ort and imagination to detect this impact in the data. Devereux (2006),
Gordon and Hines (2002), and Hines (1999) list numerous examples that show that
we're not alone in this respect. Like them, we are left with some suggestion that the
18evidence may support our premise, but also with the feeling that the factors that
a®ect investment decisions go well beyond taxes.
19A Data sources
Tables and ¯gures are based on data from the following sources:
² Devereux-Gri±th-Klemm Corporate Tax Rate Data. This is an updated version
of the data used in Devereux, Gri±th, Klemm (2002). We use the statutory
tax rate (sheet A1), the e®ective marginal tax rate (sheet A8), and the e®ective
average tax rate (sheet A12).
² OECD, Tax Revenue Database: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Coun-
tries. This includes government tax revenue by category of tax. We use two
components of \taxes on income, pro¯ts, and capital gains": taxes on individ-
uals (1100) and taxes on corporations (1200). We also use \taxes on property"
(4000).
² OECD, Economic Outlook Database. We use GDP and its expenditure compo-
nents. Real investment data are used to construct capital stocks by the perpet-
ual inventory method. We decompose real investment into housing, government,
and business components and apply di®erent depreciation rates to each. The
depreciation rate for private residential capital is constant and equal to 1.5%.
The depreciation rate for government capital increases linearly from 3% in 1970
to 4.15% in 2004. The depreciation rate for business capital increases linearly
from 5.25% in 1970 to 8.50% in 2004.
² OECD, Annual National Accounts. This is our source for the components of
gross domestic income that we use to approximate capital income.
The OECD data are available through SourceOECD.org. The Devereux-Gri±th-
Klemm data are from the website of the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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22Table 1: Capital and taxes: summary statistics
Standard Deviation
Variable Mean Overall Betw. Countries
Capital
Total capital (ratio to GDP) 3.11 0.45 0.41
Government capital (ratio to GDP) 0.56 0.19 0.19
Housing capital (ratio to GDP) 1.30 0.25 0.25
Business capital (ratio to GDP) 1.26 0.22 0.20
Taxes
Statutory corporate rate 0.38 0.11 0.08
E®ective marginal corporate rate 0.23 0.10 0.07
E®ective average corporate rate 0.28 0.09 0.06
Personal tax revenue (ratio to GDP) 0.11 0.03 0.03
Corporate tax revenue (ratio to GDP) 0.03 0.01 0.01
Corporate tax revenue (ratio to capital income) 0.07 0.03 0.03
Other
Investment (ratio to real GDP) 0.20 0.03 0.03
Capital's share of income 0.34 0.04 0.03


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Figure 1: Capital-output ratios. In the top panel, each line represents the total
capital-output ratio for a speci¯c country. In the bottom panel, the lines are the
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26Figure 2: E®ective marginal corporate tax rates. In the top panel, each line represents
the tax rate for a speci¯c country. In the bottom panel, the lines are the mean and











































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
27Figure 3: Revenue-based corporate tax rates. In the top panel, each line represents
the tax rate (ratio of corporate tax revenue to capital income) for a speci¯c country.
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